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Abstract
This paper deals with formal and simulation based verification methods of a pri-
mary-to-secondary leaking (abbreviated as PRISE) safety procedure. The PRISE
safety procedure controls the draining of the contaminated water in a faulty steam
generator when a non-compensable leaking from the primary to the secondary cir-
cuit occurs. Because of the discrete nature of the verification, a Coloured Petri Net
(CPN) representation is proposed for both the procedure and the plant model. We
have proved by using a non-model-based strategy that the PRISE safety procedure
is safe, there are no dead markings in the state-space, and all transitions are live;
being either impartial or fair.
Further analysis results have been obtained using a model-based verification ap-
proach. We created a simple, low dimensional, nonlinear dynamic model of the pri-
mary circuit in a VVER-type pressurized water nuclear power plant for the purpose
of the model-based verification. This is in contrast to the widely used safety analy-
sis that requires an accurate detailed model. Our model also describes the relevant
safety procedures, as well as all of the major leaking type faults. We propose a novel
method to transform this model to a CPN form by discretization. The composed
plant and PRISE safety procedure system has also been analysed by simulation us-
ing CPN analysis tools. We found by the model-based analysis —using both single
and multiple faults— that the PRISE safety procedure initiates the draining when
the PRISE event occurs, and no false alarm will be initiated.
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1 Introduction
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are tightly regulated complex systems, where
the issues related to their safety are of primary importance. Therefore, the
verification and validation of the applied safety procedures are also essential.
A possible and widely used way of analysing the performance of safety pro-
cedures or systems is to perform safety analysis to investigate the effects of
certain major hazardous faults, such as ruptures, by using detailed simula-
tion. Most often, versions of the RELAP5 code [1] are applied. See e.g. [2]
for a Large-Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) fault, or [3] and [4]
for a small break LOCA test in a pressurized water reactor (PWR). With the
improvement of the codes (see e.g. [5], [6]), more and more complex scenar-
ios could be analysed even for pressurized water vessel-type (VVER) reactors
(present in countries of Central and Eastern Europe) [7]. Advanced accident
analysis has also been incorporated into safety analysis reports [8]; not only
for nuclear power plants [9], but also for nuclear research reactors [10].
The need to apply formal or at least computer-aided verification methods for
safety systems has long been recognized, see e.g. [11]. This is especially im-
portant for nuclear power plants due to the large number of variables and the
complexity of the plant and its dynamic behaviour. A recent paper [12] de-
scribes a methodology to use models based on thermal-hydraulic principles to
evaluate reliability. The paper integrates the reliability evaluation results into
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). This can be regarded as a continua-
tion of earlier papers, e.g. [13] or [14]. A detailed simulation-based assessment
of the emergency operating procedure (EOP) to mitigate the steam generator
tube rupture (SGTR) initiating event in a PWR has been reported in [15].
It is well known, that NPPs possess complex nonlinear dynamics during ab-
normal events. In such circumstances the continuous dynamics is coupled by
discrete events generated by the safety and operating procedures, together
with operator actions (as demonstrated by the above mentioned safety anal-
yses). This calls for applying the methodology of discrete-continuous hybrid
systems [16]. An example, a hybrid stochastic approach for the modelling and
analysis of fire safety systems has been presented in [17], where the discrete
dynamics is described by Petri nets, and the continuous one is by a differential
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algebraic equation (DAE) model.
The difficulty in combining the traditional safety analysis methods with the
verification lies in the problems of incorporating uncertainties related to the
malfunctions into the RELAP5 based analysis. There are attempts to solve
these problems in certain specific cases, see [18].
The aim of this paper is to propose a unifying approach for the verification of
safety procedures in NPPs that strongly utilizes the structure and specialities
of the problem domain, and supports both the modelling of the underlying
plant dynamics and the verification of the procedures. For this reason, we
selected coloured Petri nets (CPNs) [19], [20] as the formalism that allows
modelling, formal analysis and simulation-based verification of safety proce-
dures in NPPs.
• CPNs and Markov-graphs have been successfully used for reliability analysis
of hybrid systems [21]. Moreover, it was shown in [22] that a process model
described in a qualitative DAE form can also be represented as a CPN.
Thus, we could use a powerful tool, the Design/CPN [23] to support the
modelling of our plant and its safety procedure in the form of a joint CPN
and perform the verification by using CPN analysis procedures.
• CPNs have also been successfully applied for modelling and verification
of safety-critical software and control components in NPPs. A CPN-based
integrated knowledge base development tool for the verification of the dy-
namic alarm system is introduced in [24]. A software requirements verifi-
cation methodology based on combined CPN and Prototype Verification
System (PVS) methods is described in [25]. Fuzzy CPNs have been used in
an automated operating procedure system [26]. Even the human factor, i.e.
the properties and dynamics of operator perception and actions could be
described using CPNs [27].
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the problem statement
including a short introduction to the plant and its dynamics, as well as to
the investigated PRImary-to-SEcondary leaking (PRISE) safety procedure.
Thereafter, our methods and results of the non model-based verification are
presented. This is followed by the description of the simple hybrid continuous
time state-space model and its CPN form. We developed these models to de-
scribe the dynamics of the plant and its relevant controllers, safety procedures
and fault events. Our procedures and results of the model-based verification
are presented afterwards. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
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2 The PRISE safety procedure and the aim of its verification
The safety procedure analysed in this paper was designed for the Paks Nuclear
Power Plant (Paks NPP), located in Hungary. The plant operates four VVER-
440/213 type pressurized water reactor (PWR) units with a total nominal
(electrical) power of 1860 MW. About 40 percent of the electrical energy
generated in Hungary is produced here. Considering the load factors, the Paks
units belong to the leading ones in the world and have been among the top
twenty-five units for years.
Fig. 1 shows the flowsheet of the primary circuit in Paks NPP (with certain
units from the secondary circuit). The main equipment: the reactor, the steam
generator(s), the reactor coolant (or primary) pump(s), the pressurizer and
their connections are depicted in the figure. The sensors providing on-line
measurements are indicated by small black rectangles. The controllers are
denoted by double rectangles, their input and output signals are shown by
dashed lines.
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Fig. 1. The primary circuit and its operating units
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2.1 The PRISE fault event and its process consequences
The PRImary-to-SEcondary leaking (abbreviated as PRISE) is one of the ma-
jor failures of the NPP. A PRISE event occurs when there is a rupture or
other leakage within the steam generator affecting either a few (3-10) tubes or
their collector that contain the high-pressure activated liquid of the primary
circuit. The PRISE event is the VVER-440/213 analogue of the well inves-
tigated Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) event (see e.g. [15], [28]) in
the other pressurized water reactors.
In the unlikely case of a PRISE event, the corresponding safety procedures take
care of the reactor trip (i.e. the emergency shutdown of the reactor) and then
of the isolation of the faulty steam generator. However, there is a possibility
to release some of the contaminated water to the environment, if the event is
not handled properly. In order to prevent this possibility, the experts at the
plant devised the following solution:
• they added a safety valve to each steam generator that drains the contam-
inated water into the containment, and
• they developed a new safety procedure, called the PRISE safety procedure,
to control the operation of these safety valves.
As a preliminary safety analysis step, simulation investigations have been car-
ried out by using a RELAP5 [1] based code fitted to the Paks NPP conditions
[29]. These simulations included the PRISE initiating event, and also other ma-
jor related rupture or leakage type events, such as LOss-Of-Coolant-Accident
(LOCA) and leakage in the pressurizer. As a result, the event sequence gener-
ated by a PRISE event —when the initial plant state is in its normal operating
mode and no other fault occurs— has been determined as follows (the descrip-
tion uses the notation list in the Appendix in Table 4):
(1) First the decrease of primary circuit pressure pPR is observed that implies
the safety event pPR < 11.2 MPa. This causes an automatic reactor trip
when the control rods reach their bottom position (χRSHUT = 1).
(2) When the secondary water and steam mass flowrates fall into a nominal
low level, the reactor trip initiates the turbine shutdown. This causes the
faulty steam generator water level ℓSG to increase.
(3) The water level increase will eventually initiate a level alarm in the faulty
steam generator (∆ℓSG > +600 mm) that automatically initiates the
isolation of the faulty steam generator resulting in an even more increase
in ℓSG.
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2.2 The PRISE safety procedure
The purpose of the PRISE safety procedure is to initiate the draining if and
only if a PRISE event occurs. This includes preventing the steam generators
from being drained when a fault event (causing similar symptoms but not
classified as a PRISE event) occurs, i.e. the PRISE safety procedure should be
selective. In order to achieve this behaviour, the fault events causing similar
symptoms have been examined by a thorough safety analysis using RELAP5
code [1], and the distinctive event sequence for the detection of the PRISE
event has been selected.
When the system is not in a normal operating regime, but is either being
started or shut down, the PRISE safety procedure is designed not to be active.
The reactor operators manually initiate draining should the need arise.
Faults and operating regimes make the selective detection of a PRISE fault
event complicated. Furthermore, one of the key sensors, the water level (ℓSG)
sensor of the steam generators is highly unreliable. It tends to show randomly
spuriously high level due to the solid scale content of the secondary water. This
measurement error is even more frequent in the transient operation regime.
The steam generator water level sensor is not part of the reactor safety system,
therefore it is not duplicated.
With the above considerations, the technological and system experts at Paks
Nuclear Power plant have designed a timed logical scheme, the PRISE safety
procedure, in a heuristic way. The description of the inputs and outputs of the
PRISE safety procedure is included in Table 1.
The designed safety procedure initiates the draining (OUTPUT-1) when a
critical decrease in the primary pressure (INPUT-2 signal) is followed (after
a specified time delay) by the increase of the steam generator water level
(INPUT-1 signal). However, the draining is initiated only if the containment
pressure signal (INPUT-3) keeps its nominal value (i.e. it is not increasing
due to another, non-PRISE fault causing an inflow of the primary water into
the containment). Also, the INPUT-1 signal must hold its active value for
more than a certain time interval, otherwise it is regarded as inactive. This
filtering function is used is to prevent the incorrect initiation of draining by the
unreliable water level sensor measurement showing temporarily a spuriously
high value.
The INPUT-4 and INPUT-9 input conditions inhibit the operation in a startup
or shutdown situation. INPUT-5 resets the operation of the PRISE safety
procedure after a reactor trip. INPUT-6 and INPUT-7 prevent the erroneous
draining of the containment after the isolation of a steam generator caused by
a non-PRISE fault.
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Table 1
PRISE safety procedure I/O description
Notation Short name Description
INPUT-1 SG level high Steam generator water level is increasing
(∆ℓSG > +600 mm) (due to closure of the turbine)
INPUT-2 Primary pressure decreasing The pressure of the primary water is decreasing
(pPR < 11.2 MPa) (due to the PRISE or other leakage)
INPUT-3 Containment pressure is normal The pressure of the containment is not increasing
(pCN < 0.1 MPa) (no primary water inflow due to a non-PRISE fault)
INPUT-4 Primary temp. below nominal Technical condition signifying that the reactor
(TCL < 245
oC) is in startup/shutdown operation
INPUT-5 Control rods fully down Technical condition used to reset the operation
(χRSHUT = 1) of the PRISE safety procedure
INPUT-6 SG deltaP Technical conditions to avoid erroneous draining of
INPUT-7 SG RAP 1/2 secondary water after isolation of steam generator
INPUT-8 SG inhibition Technical condition used to take
the SG inhibited state into consideration
INPUT-9 Primary pressure low Technical condition signifying that the reactor
(pPR < 5 MPa) is in startup/shutdown operation
OUTPUT-1 GFINH1 (SG is inhermetical) Primary output of the PRISE safety procedure
activating the secondary water drain
OUTPUT-2 ACTIVE Auxiliary output used in control operations
The primary OUTPUT-1 of the procedure shows the presence of a PRISE
event. Note that the auxiliary OUTPUT-2 signal indicates the presence of all
but one of the symptoms of the PRISE situation.
3 Formal verification using coloured Petri nets
There are several approaches presented in the literature to the problem of
formal verification and validation of programmable logic controller (PLC)
based industrial control and monitoring systems. The interested reader can
find many examples and case studies in the references [11], [30], and [31]. We
refer to the classification presented in [32], which groups the existing method-
ologies according to three main aspects: approach, description formalism, and
analysis method. Two important types of approaches can be distinguished:
• Model based: in these solutions a model of the process under control is in-
cluded in the analysis. The properties checked by verification are statements
on the controlled system.
• Non model based: these approaches analyse the formal description of the
control system/algorithm without taking into account the process and its
characteristics.
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3.1 Coloured Petri net model of the PRISE safety procedure
Our choice for the description formalism of the PRISE safety procedure is
the Coloured Petri net (CPN) [33]. CPN is an extension of Petri nets: most
important differences are that places can contain coloured tokens (i.e. multi-
sets) that can symbolize the data content in data flow models, and that CP
nets are hierarchically structured using substitution transitions and subnets.
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Fig. 2. The Coloured Petri net model of the PRISE safety procedure
Fig. 2 shows the high-level prime page of our CPN model. The larger rectangles
are substitution transitions that denote subnets of the corresponding function
blocks. The smaller net elements are simple places and transitions that are
only needed for connecting the subnets.
The verification of the CPN model includes two major classes of checked prop-
erties: common attributes corresponding to the run-time environment in the
digital control system (DCS), and problem-specific requirements concerning
the PRISE safety procedure.
The run-time environment is a highly dependable digital process control com-
puter. This uses a 50 millisecond long scan cycle. During each scan cycle the
controller first samples its inputs, then evaluates all of its functional diagram
pages, computes its new internal state, and sets the outputs. In the remaining
time it performs self-tests.
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In the CPN model the propagation of the tokens represents the flow of data
through the functional diagram. In each scan cycle of the model a single
coloured token is put into each input place. The colour of the input tokens
carries the input data value. These tokens initiate the evaluation of the sub-
nets modelling the function blocks. When every subnet has been evaluated, a
single coloured token is generated into each output place, and the scan cycle
ends. The CPN model has a feedback loop (not included in Fig. 2) that takes
away every generated token from the outputs and simultaneously puts a new
token into every input place, so that a new scan cycle can begin.
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Fig. 3. The CPN subnet model of the SR1 function block
Fig. 3 presents the CPN model of the SR1 function block (Static RS flip-
flop, preferred state on reset, priority on reset) mentioned in the timed logical
description of the PRISE safety procedure. This subnet is substituted for each
instance of the SR1 transition in the high-level model in Fig. 2. If the Set input
is activated (BI1 input place is marked with a token coloured with value 1),
the output is set to active (BO1 output place receives a token coloured with
value 1). Similarly, the activation of the Reset input (BI2 input place) makes
the output inactive (a coloured with value 0 is put into the BO1 output place).
When both inputs are active, the Reset function dominates. With both inputs
inactive, or when any of the input signals is invalid, then the SR1 function
block maintains the actual state of the output signal. Initially the output is
inactive.
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3.2 Analysis of the coloured Petri net model
The advantage of Petri net and CPN models is that they have a broad selection
of analysis techniques; some of which even avoid the state explosion problem
[34]:
• Structural analysis techniques construct no state space at all, because
they work directly on the structure of the Petri net. Results are structural
properties and invariants (place or transition invariants).
• Dynamic (reachability) analysis techniques are based on the exhaus-
tive construction and exploration of the state space (reachability graph).
Dynamic analysis can be used even if a desired system property cannot be
determined by structural analysis.
• The lazy state space construction method is also available to build re-
duced (interleaving) state spaces. The reduction is based on an appropriate
equivalence function, which maps several equivalent states into one.
In addition to these techniques, many analysis tools based on Petri nets (e.g.
PEP, PROD, Design/CPN) allow the verification of the model by checking
temporal expressions using an integrated model checker.
3.2.1 Non-model-based results: dynamic properties of the PRISE CPN
The results of the dynamic analysis of the PRISE CPN provide a lot of im-
portant information for verification. The dynamic properties of the coloured
Petri net model of the PRISE safety procedure are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Dynamic properties of the PRISE CPN model
Property Result
Boundedness The PRISE CPN is multi-set bounded.
The PRISE CPN is safe in the integer sense.
Liveness The PRISE CPN with feedback is deadlock-free.
All transitions related to the primary output signal are live.
Fairness Each live transition is at least impartial or fair.
Since all places in the net are multi-set bounded, the model has a finite (albeit
large) state space. The upper multi-set bounds of places describe the opera-
tional range of the corresponding signals. The lower multi-set bounds of places
prove that the resources (such as the inner state of the time dependent blocks)
are preserved. The corresponding places contain a token in all states of the
operation.
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The net is safe in the integer sense, meaning that each place contains at
most one coloured token in any state. This partially confirms that the both
the intended data-flow behaviour and the functional structure is correctly
expressed in the CPN model.
The PRISE CPN with the feedback loop is deadlock-free, therefore there are no
dead markings. The safety logic will not “freeze” in any state of operation. All
transitions involved in the activation of the primary output signal (OUTPUT-
1) are live. Thus, the PRISE safety procedure is able to activate the emergency
activity, and retains this capability during the whole operation.
The fairness property of each live transition is at least impartial or fair. This
implies both of these two important attributes:
(1) they can fire infinite times, that is the functionality is repeatable, and
(2) neither “domination”, nor “starvation” of the activities can occur.
3.2.2 Non model based results: CPN model checking
After the dynamic analysis of the CP net model we can see the basic char-
acteristics of the PRISE safety logic, and have partially verified our model.
However, there are also selectivity requirements concerning the PRISE, di-
vided into two main types:
• always if PRISE occurs in every normal operation regime coupled with
sensor fault in ℓSG that is highly unreliable,
• never if PRISE does not occur even if severe faults causing similar symptoms
occur.
We can translate these requirements into verification goals the following way:
• Operational requirement (“it is always true that something good will
eventually happen”): the PRISE safety procedure is always activated when
a real PRISE accident has occurred (no actuation masking).
• Safety requirement (“something bad never happens” [34]): the draining
of the secondary water is not activated if not a real PRISE accident has
occurred (no erroneous actuation).
Although the PRISE safety procedure is relatively simple, its complete state-
space is immense (it has approx. 1014 states) due to its cyclic operation (mod-
elled by the feedback loop), and the internal sequential function blocks (the
flip-flop, pulse and delay blocks). Thus, an exhaustive analysis of the state-
space cannot be performed with most of the analysis tools (including our
chosen tool, the Design/CPN).
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Therefore we need to partition the state space in the non model based to
be able to perform our analysis. We can analyse parts of the state space by
defining constrained input scenarios. In our case study, we examined the ini-
tiation of the OUTPUT-1 (secondary water draining activation) signal under
nominal conditions. Thus, all the input signals had either constant values or
step-function values, except the “SG level high” (INPUT-1) signal. These in-
puts were set to match the activation conditions of the OUTPUT-1 signal.
The level measurement is unreliable, therefore the INPUT-1 received a ran-
dom, non-deterministically chosen binary value.
In order to prove the safety and operational requirements, we have proved sev-
eral subconditions using both state space search methods and model checking:
(1) The OUTPUT-2 and OUTPUT-1 signals are activated in all trajecto-
ries of the state space (this is an operational condition, since the initial
activation conditions are always present in the scenario under analysis).
(2) In all trajectories of the state space the OUTPUT-1 signal can only be
activated after the OUTPUT-2 signal, and not in the reverse order.
(3) Neither the OUTPUT-2 nor the OUTPUT-1 signal can be activated in-
correctly by the ’SG level high’ signal when the enabling conditions are
not present (that is while the INPUT-2 signal is still delayed).
(4) The “ONDELAY” functional block connected to INPUT-1 correctly fil-
ters the transient behaviour of the ’SG level high’ signal: the filtered signal
will only be activated if the ’SG level high’ signal remains continuously
active during the filtering interval. Shorter “spikes” of this signal cannot
make the filtered signal to become active.
(5) The activation of the filtered ’SG level high’ signal will always activate
the OUTPUT-2 and subsequently the OUTPUT-1 signals when the other
enabling conditions are present.
The main advantage of the non model based analysis is that the requirements
for the safety procedure can be formulated and checked with respect to the
functional specification. Consequently, this type of verification does not require
a process engineering background. However, these advantages are counterbal-
anced by the complexity of the analysis and the immense state space, which
make this analysis type impractical. A large portion of this huge state-space
is generated by input sequences that are completely unrealistic due to phys-
ical and technological constraints. The answer is a model based approach by
supplementing the model of the control logic with a model of the controlled
process. Including the model of the reactor in the verification removes the
“impractical” segment of the state-space from the analysis.
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4 Modelling for safety procedure verification: a CPN model of the
plant
A simple concentrated parameter continuous time model is developed in this
section for fault diagnostic purposes. The developed model will then be trans-
formed to a CPN. This CPN model will be used for the formal verification in
the next section.
4.1 Simple dynamic continuous time model
There are a few papers in the literature that report on developing simple
dynamic models for boiling water or pressurized water reactors (mainly for
training and control purposes). Unfortunately, these models do not contain the
description of the major leaking type faults that are vital for the PRISE safety
procedure verification. Therefore, a systematic modelling procedure suggested
for constructing process models [35] has been followed to construct a simple
dynamic model of the primary circuit that is able to describe the above faults.
A similar model developed for controller design purposes is reported in [36],
where the nuclear reaction specific model elements have also be taken into
account in their simplest form [37].
4.1.1 Simplifying assumptions
One does not need a full distributed parameter dynamic model commonly
used for safety calculations [1] for the formal verification. Only the sequence of
events and the timing between them is of importance. Therefore, simplifying
modelling assumptions are used to develop a simple dynamic model. These
simplifying assumptions specify the considered operating units, their general
properties and the properties of the considered fault events.
A1 Perfectly stirred (concentrated parameter) operating units are assumed that
consist of the liquid in the primary circuit (PC), the 6 steam generators
(SG), the pressurizer (PR), and the containment (CN). A joint balance vol-
ume is assumed for the liquid in the primary circuit and for the pressurizer.
A2 Only simplified mass and energy balances are assumed for every balance vol-
ume, but only a mass balance is constructed for the containment. Moreover,
constant physico-chemical properties are used for every balance volume.
A3 Controllers are assumed to be “ideal” under normal operating conditions,
i.e. they keep the reference value of their controlled variable without any
error. In case of faults an input-constrained operation model is considered,
when they produce a given upper or lower bound value of their controlled
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variable. The following controllers are taken into account: PR-pressure, PC-
mass through PR-level, SG-mass through steam outflow mass from SG.
A4 Safety procedures are discrete controllers acting on the system when a safety
condition is fulfilled. The simplest binary “on-off” operation of the reac-
tor trip (emergency shutdown) and the steam generator isolation safety
procedures is taken into account with the indicator variables χRSHUT , and
χSGLOC, respectively.
A5 The PRISE fault event is modelled as an instantaneous permanent fault in-
dicated by the (χPRISE = 1) condition (while the indicator variable χPRISE
is zero otherwise). The leaking has a constant known mass flow ratemPRISE
from the primary to the secondary circuit.
A6 The other faults considered are: (i) leakage in the primary circuit indicated
by χLOCA with a constant known mass flow rate, such that mLOCA >>
mPRISE, (ii) leakage in the pressurizer indicated by χPRLO with a con-
stant known mass flow rate mPRLO < mPRISE (iii) sensor fault in SG level
χSGLFAIL. The first two are considered to be instantaneous and permanent,
while the latter has a temporal, stochastic character.
A7 The reactor power control is also assumed to be “ideal”, i.e. the reactor
power is either its nominal value WR or only the remaining power WMINR
is emitted when it is shut down.
A8 The purge and normal supply of the liquid in the primary circuit is neglected.
A9 The initial state of any investigated scenario is the normal operating state
of the system.
A10 The model output variables should be the ones that are the inputs to the
PRISE safety procedure
• pressure in the primary circuit pPR,
• secondary steam pressure pSG,
• level in the steam generator ℓSG,
• pressure in the containment pCN ,
• cold leg temperature in the primary circuit TCL.
4.1.2 Continuous time model equations
Dynamic conservation balances form the basis of our dynamic engineering
model. They are constructed for conserved extensive quantities over balance
volumes (operating units). Such balances have been constructed for the overall
mass and internal energy of the liquid in the primary circuit and in the steam
generators, as well as for the overall mass in the containment. Thereafter, the
intensive form of the energy balance equations has been computed to obtain
differential equations for the measurable temperature T

instead of its related
internal energy U

, where  = PC, SG. There are additional algebraic equations
that complement the differential conservation balance equations.
Together with the continuous or state-switched continuous dynamics of the
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Liquid in the primary iruit and pressurizer
Balane (state) equations
dMPC
dt
= −χPRISEmPRISE − χLOCAmLOCA − χMP R≥0χPRLOmPRLO
cP,PCMPC
dTPC
dt
= (1− χRSHUT )WR + χRSHUTWMINR
−Kloss,PC · (TPC − T0)− (1− χSGLOC) · 6 ·KT,SG(TPC − TSG)
Output equations
MPR = MPC −M
0
PC
pPR = χMP R≥0 · π(MPR) (π linear)
TCL = TPC − 15
The steam generator
Balane (state) equations
dMSG
dt
= (1− χSGLOC)(mSGIN −mSGOUT ) + χPRISEmPRISE
cP,SGMSG
dTSG
dt
= (1− χRSHUT ) ((1 − χSGLOC)cP,SGmSGIN(TSGIN − TSG)−mSGOUTEevap)
+ χRSHUT ·mr · ((1 − χSGLOC) (cP,SGmSGIN(TSGIN − TSG)−mSGOUTEevap))
+ (1− χSGLOC)KT,SG(TPC − TSG)
+ χPRISEmPRISE(cP,PCTPC − cP,SGTSG)
−Kloss,SG(TSG − T0)
Output equations
ℓSG = L(MSG) + χSGLFAILℓ
∗ (L linear)
pSG = ϕ(TSG) (ϕ linear)
Containment
Balane (state) equations
dMCN
dt
= χLOCAmLOCA + χMPR≥0χPRLOmPRLO
Output equations
pCN = KCNMCN + p0
Safety proedure onditions
Reator emergeny shutdown
χRSHUT = (pPR < p
∗
PR)
Steam generator isolation
χSGLOC = (ℓSG > ℓ
∗
SG) ∧ (tellap > t
∗
ellap)
Fig. 4. The model equations of the continuous model
plant, we consider the operation of the safety procedures as part of our plant
model. The reactor trip (emergency shutdown) procedure shuts down the re-
actor when the pressure of the primary circuit pPR is below a given level.
Similarly, a steam generator is isolated by a SG isolation safety procedure if
its water level ℓSG is too high, but here a timing condition is also applied to
avoid the effect of the non-reliable level sensor.
The model equations are shown in Fig. 4. They will be used for the model-
based verification of the PRISE safety procedure.
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From the system theoretical viewpoint, this model describes a (partially) con-
trolled system, that belongs to a concentrated parameter nonlinear hybrid
model class. The state equations are the differential equations that originate
from conservation balances. The output equations are algebraic equations that
are all linear. Thus the continuous state and related output variables are
MPC , TPC and pPR, TCL
MSG, TSG and ℓSG, pSG
MCN and pCN
The state-dependent indicator or switching variables χMPR≥0, χRSHUT and
χSGLOC make the dynamics to be hybrid even if no fault occurs. The faults
are modelled as time-dependent discrete disturbances through their indica-
tor variables χPRISE , χLOCA, χPRLO and χSGLFAIL. These are considered as
discrete fault inputs when the model-based verification is performed.
The discrete outputs from the hybrid engineering model is computed by a set
of simple logical expressions
INPUT− 1 = ℓSG > ℓ
∗
SG
INPUT− 2 = pPR < p
∗
PR
INPUT− 3 = pCN > p
∗
CN
INPUT− 4 = TCL < T
∗
CL
INPUT− 5 = χRSHUT
INPUT− 6 = pSG < p
∗
SG
INPUT− 7 = pSG < p
∗
SG
INPUT− 9 = pPR < p
∗∗
PR
(1)
with p∗∗PR << p
∗
PR, and with all the limit variables denoted by an upper index
∗ are known constants.
4.2 The CPN form of the dynamic engineering model
From the methodological point of view, there are two entirely different ap-
proaches to describe and analyse hybrid dynamic systems. One way is to
embed the discrete valued time-dependent variables into an existing dynam-
ical model [16], for example into a state-space model. The other way, that is
followed in this paper, is to extend the discrete event system techniques [38]
with the continuous dynamical information in the form of waiting or execution
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times to get a timed automaton or Petri net in the simplest case, or to de-
fine some more or less simple dynamics associated to each state and/or state
transition.
Driven by the actual aim of modelling, analysis and/or control, further approx-
imations can be or should be made to transform the description to a homoge-
neous discrete event system model form [39]. This allows to use, for example,
the well-established methods for model analysis developed for discrete event
systems. Thus the model developed in sub-section 4.1 is transformed here to
a CPN form by discretization in both time and in the range of the variables
similarly to [22].
The discretization procedure is illustrated with the part of the continuous time
model that corresponds to the containment:
dMCN
dt
=χLOCAmLOCA + χMPR≥0χPRLOmPRLO (2)
pCN =KCNMCN + p0 (3)
The steps in obtaining a CPN version of a hybrid differential-algebraic equa-
tion model are as follows.
(1) Define a sampling time interval for the discretization.
(2) Divide the range space of the continuous state, input and output variables
to intervals by an ordered set of landmark points. The landmark points
can be conveniently chosen by the given limit values dictated by the
safety application, such as p∗PR, p
∗∗
PR, in our case. The values of a variable
within one of its intervals are regarded to be indistinguishable, they will
be represented by a coloured token on a place of the CPN model that
corresponds to the variable.
(3) The places of the CPN model correspond to the variables: a single place
corresponds to each of the input, disturbance and output variables, while
two places are associated with a state variable.
(4) Transitions correspond to the equations in the model: the output arc
function of the transitions in the CPN model describe the algebraic ex-
pressions present in the equations.
(5) The state (differential) equations have been integrated by using a simple
Euler method that is implemented by an algebraic equation computing
the current value of the differential variable from its value at the previous
discrete time step.
For example, the discretized-in-time version of Eq. (2) is:
MCN = h · (MCN,prev + χLOCAmLOCA + χMPR≥0χPRLOmPRLO)
with the sampling interval h and with MCN,prev(k) =MCN (k − 1) at the
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kth sampling interval.
Fig. 5 shows part of the transformed CPN model that corresponds to the
containment equations.
khi_LOCA
BINARY
khi_PRLO
BINARY
M_CN
INT
P_CN
INTP Out
EQ_11
M_CN_prev
INT1‘0
EQ_10
(*** M_PR ***)
fun eq_2 ( m_PC ) = m_PC - M_PC_0;
(*** M_CN ***)
fun eq_10 ( m_CN, m_PC, khi_prise, khi_loca, khi_prlo ) = 
	    m_CN + ( khi_loca * m_LOCA + phi_MPR(eq_2(m_PC)) * khi_prlo * m_PRLO) div time;
(*** p_CN ***)
fun eq_11 ( m_CN, khi_prlo, khi_loca )  = (khi_prlo * 15 + khi_loca) * K_CN * m_CN div 4 + 100000;
eq_11(m_CN,khi_prlo,khi_loca)m_CN
m_CN
eq_10(m_CN,m_PC,khi_loca,khi_prlo)
khi_prlo
khi_loca
m_CN
khi_prlo
khi_loca
m_PC
Fig. 5. The containment part in the CPN form of the engineering model
5 Model-based verification by simulation
The developed dynamic engineering model is used in this section for the model-
based formal verification of the PRISE safety procedure. Because of the hybrid
and nonlinear nature of the system dynamics in faulty conditions, the most
commonly used verification method, the verification by using simulation is
applied.
For NPPs a detailed dynamic simulator of the plant is usually applied as the
model (see e.g. [40]), but then one needs to be able to modify the code and
interface the safety procedure with the model. Instead, we shall use the CPN
form of the engineering model developed above, and the CPN analysis tools
[23] to perform the verification.
5.1 The composite system to be analysed
In order to focus the attention to the verification of the PRISE safety proce-
dure, a composite CPN has been formed from the CPN model of the plant,
and that of the PRISE safety procedure connected by a logical precalculation
subnet realized also in CPN form as shown in Fig. 6. The precalculation block
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implements the discretization of the range of the continuous variables to form
digital inputs to the PRISE procedure block, similarly to an analog-digital
converter using the equations (1).
SYSTEM
MODEL
PRISE
SAFETY
PROCEDURE
PRE-
CALC-
ULA-
TIONpSG
TCL
pCN
pPR
lSGXPRISE
XLOCA
XPRLO
XSGFAIL
OUTPUT-1
OUTPUT-2
INPUT-1
INPUT-2
INPUT-3
INPUT-4
INPUT-5
INPUT-6
INPUT-7
INPUT-8
INPUT-9
Fig. 6. The structure of the composite system
Thanks to the composition, the overall CPN model used for the formal verifica-
tion has only four inputs, the fault indicator variables χPRISE, χLOCA, χPRLO
and χSGLFAIL together with two logical outputs, where OUTPUT-1 corre-
sponds to the initiation of the draining signal and OUTPUT-2 corresponds to
the activation signal.
5.2 Time-dependent modelling of the water level sensor fault
As it has been mentioned before in sub-section 2.2 for the description of the
PRISE safety procedure, the water level sensor of the steam generators causes
most of the problems, because it can show spuriously high levels. The model
equation (see in Fig. 4)
ℓSG = L(MSG) + χSGLFAILℓ
∗ (L linear)
models this fault as an additive value to the real level driven by the fault
indicator χSGLFAIL, that is assumed to be time-dependent and stochastic.
5.3 Single leaking fault verification scenarios
In order to illustrate the method and results of the proposed model-based
formal verification method, nine scenarios have been defined and analysed.
These scenarios contain situations with at most two simultaneous faults with
a single occurrence of a major leaking initiating event. The faults considered
have been classified to be either major leaking faults (with indicator variables
χPRISE for the PRISE event, χLOCA for the leakage in the primary circuit, and
χPRLO for leakage in the pressurizer tank) with only one of them occurring
simultaneously, or to be a sensor fault (with indicator variable χSGLFAIL)
that has been considered independently. The worst case scenarios have been
considered where the major leaking fault occurs at the same time when the
possible sensor fault starts.
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• The “NO fault” situation corresponds to the nominal “easiest” case, when
only a single leaking type fault (either PRISE or LOCA or PRLO) happens
but the level sensor operates normally.
• The “SHORT fault” situation, when a 1 sec faulty behaviour is assumed for
the water level sensor of the steam generator, can be compensated by the
corresponding value checking element in the PRISE safety procedure.
• The “LONG fault” situation, when 15 sec faulty behaviour is assumed for
the water level sensor, is a “worst case” scenario, because it cannot be
compensated by the corresponding value checking element.
5.3.1 Verification results
The results of the verification test cases have been collected by using the
utilities of the Design/CPN tool [23]. The initial state of the plant was a
steady state that corresponds to the normal operating conditions. For each of
the verification scenarios the time variation of the steam generator level sensor
fault indicator variable χSGLFAIL of the water level signal (ℓSG), and the two
output signals: the OUTPUT-2 (activation) and OUTPUT-1 (the draining
initialization signal) of the system have been generated.
Fig. 7 shows an example of the time dependent results of the verification
by simulation in the form of time plots generated by the Design/CPN tool
in the case when the “LONG fault” situation is investigated. In the figure
the draining initiation (OUTPUT-1) and the auxiliary activation (OUTPUT-
2) signals are depicted by dashed and dotted lines, respectively. The steam
generator level characterizing variables, the measured level (ℓSG, denoted by
full line) and the sensor fault indicator variable (χSGLFAIL, dashed-dotted line)
are also shown.
The results show that only the PRISE fault event induces the OUTPUT-
1 signal initiating the draining, even when a similar leaking fault (LOCA
or PRLO) and a severe (LONG) level sensor signal fault occur. Although
the auxiliary OUTPUT-2 signal becomes active for the PRLO situation —
indicating that all but one symptom is present for initiating the draining—
but the procedure still prevents the system to be drained, i.e. OUTPUT-1 does
not become activated. This means that the PRISE safety procedure indeed
safely initiates the draining, and it is selective with respect to the LOCA and
PRLO events.
Because of the discrete nature of our dynamic model and the verification aim,
only the occurrence times of the safety relevant events, the emergency reactor
shutdown (χRSHUT ), the draining initiation (OUTPUT-1) and the activation
(OUTPUT-2) were recorded as simulation results (see Table 3). It is important
to note that the occurrence times cannot be considered as accurate ones, but
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Fig. 7. Major leaking fault events combined with ”Long” level sensor fault
the sequence of events is the one that matters for the verification.
The verification results are summarized in the top three rows of Table 3. In
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each of the three multi-columns corresponding to NO, SHORT and LONG
fault cases, the occurrence time of the signals OUTPUT-2, OUTPUT-1 (ab-
breviated as O2 and O1, respectively) and χRSHUT (the emergency shutdown
of the reactor) are given.
Table 3
Simulation results: indicator variable occurrence times (sec)
NO χSGLF AIL SHORT χSGLF AIL LONG χSGLF AIL
Scenario O2 O1 χRSHUT O2 O1 χRSHUT O2 O1 χRSHUT
LOCA – – 124 – – 125 – – 134
PRLO 228 – 126 229 – 127 233 – 131
PRISE 233 311 131 233 311 131 233 311 121
LOCA & PRLO – – 1 – – 1 – – 1
LOCA & PRISE – – 1 – – 1 – – 1
PRLO & PRISE 137 – 35 130 – 28 134 – 33
LOCA & PRLO
& PRISE
– – 1 – – 1 – – 1
Abbreviations: O2 = OUTPUT-2, O1 = OUTPUT-1
5.4 Multiple leaking fault verification scenarios
Some multiple leaking fault verification scenarios have also been tested, com-
bined again with the NO, SHORT and LONG level sensor fault situations.
Observe that these cases involve four independent faults in the worst case.
Their leaking types are independent major faults with very low probability.
The verification results are included in the last four rows of Table 3. Although
the PRISE event is not detected by the tested safety procedure in any of the
investigated cases (no occurrence of the OUTPUT-1 signal), but a reactor
trip occurs almost immediately by the emergency shutdown procedure that is
indicated by the occurrence time of the χRSHUT . This is technically correct,
because the reactor emergency shutdown prevents the further increase of the
level in the faulty steam generator, therefore no emission into the environment
is possible.
6 Conclusion and future work
This paper proposes methods of formal and simulation based verification of
the PRISE safety procedure. The verification aim is discrete in nature, so we
developed a discrete dynamic representation of the safety procedure in the
form of coloured Petri nets (CPNs). This allowed the powerful formal analysis
techniques included in Design/CPN tool to be used for the verification. By
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using a non-model-based strategy we could prove that the PRISE safety proce-
dure is safe, there are no dead markings in the state-space, and all transitions
are live with being either impartial or fair.
In this case the rapid growth of the search space prevented us to carry out
a thorough verification. We partitioned the state space and selected the most
important segment —the effect of the unreliable level measurement signal on
the initiation of the safety procedure— for analysis.
We also developed a model-based approach for the verification of the PRISE
safety procedure. This approach requires that both the safety procedure and
the dynamic model of the plant are transformed into CPN form. In contrast to
the standard safety analysis methodology that requires an accurate detailed
dynamic model of the plant, we could use a simple low dimensional nonlinear
dynamic model of the primary circuit in a VVER-type nuclear power plant.
The model describes all of the major leaking type faults combined with a
level sensor fault, and also includes the relevant safety procedures. Our paper
proposes a novel method to transform the developed concentrated parameter
hybrid model to its CPN form by discretization.
The model based verification has been performed by discrete dynamic simu-
lation using the Design/CPN tool. As a result, the occurrence sequence of the
fault relevant events, the reactor shutdown, the activation and the draining
initiation was investigated under different scenarios including multiple faults.
We found by the model-based analysis that the PRISE safety procedure initi-
ates the draining when the PRISE event occurs, and no false alarm has been
found.
Our further work is directed towards model-based formal verification using
the composite CPN model of the plant and the safety procedure. Because
of the size of the search space this will only be possible if the “lazy state
space construction” approach based on equivalence classes (known in the CPN
analysis methodology) will be applied.
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Nomenclature
Table 4 contains the variables of the dynamic model and the PRISE safety
procedure. The operating unit the variable belongs to is also indicated, that
can be
• ”R” for the reactor,
• ”PC” for the liquid in the primary circuit,
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• ”PR” pressurizer,
• ”SG” steam generator,
• ”CN” containment.
Thereafter the identifiers of the physical parameters and their explanation are
collected in Table 5.
The nominal value of the variables and the value of the parameters are the
same as in [36].
Table 4
Variables
Identifier Unit: Variable
MPC PC: water mass
TPC PC: water temperature
TCL PC: cold leg temperature
MPR PR: water mass
pPR PR: pressure
TSG SG: steam generator temperature
MSG SG: secondary water mass
pSG SG: steam pressure
ℓSG SG: secondary water level
MCN CN: water mass
pCN CN: pressure
χPRISE PC: PRISE indicator variable
χLOCA PC: LOCA indicator variable
χPRLO PR: leak indicator variable
χRSHUT R: shutdown indicator variable
χSGLOC SG: locked indicator variable
χSGLFAIL SG: level sensor failure ind. var.
χMPR≥0 PR: empty indicator variable
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Table 5
Physical parameters
Unit Identifier Parameter
R WR Reactor power
WMINR Reactor remained power
PR M0PC Water mass in PC without PR
PC KT,SG Heat transfer coefficient
Kloss,PC Heat loss transfer coefficient
T0 Reference temperature
cp,PC Specific heat
SG cp,SG Specific heat
Kloss,SG Heat loss transfer coefficient
T0 Reference temperature
Eevap,SG Evaporation coefficient
mSGIN Inlet mass flow rate
mSGOUT Purge mass flow rate
TSGIN Inlet water temperature
mr Reduced mass flow coefficient
CN KCN Pressure coefficient
p0 Pressure offset
Errors mPRISE PRISE mass flow rate
mLOCA LOCA mass flow rate
mPRLO Leaky PR mass flow rate
Outputs ℓ∗SG Maximal water level in SG
p∗PR Minimal pressure in PC
p∗∗PR Safety pressure in PC
p∗CN Maximal pressure in CN
T ∗CL Minimal water temperature in PC
p∗SG Minimal pressure in SG
t∗elap Minimal elapsed time
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